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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This case stems from an employment offer made by Parkway Surgical Center, 
LLC ("Parkway") to Michelle Campbell ("Campbell"). Parkway hired Campbell on 
approximately May 27, 2003. As part of the offer of employment, Parkway represented 
to Campbell that it would "take care of' a monetary obligation Campbell may have had 
with her previous employer, Bingham Memorial Hospital ("BMH"). Campbell then 
worked for Parkway for approximately 2 years. Campbell was never pursued by BMH 
for her obligation to BMH, and has neither paid nor lost anything as a result of that 
potential obligation to BMH. More importantly, it has never been adjudicated that an 
obligation by Campbell to BMH even exists. 
Campbell sued Parkway for breach of contract, and prevailed at the Magistrate 
Court before Judge Robert C. Brower. 1 On appeal, the District Court (Judge Darren B. 
Simpson, presiding) reformed Judge Brower's breach of contract decision, finding that 
Campbell had not suffered an economic injury - a prerequisite to a breach of contract 
claim. However, the District Court imposed a new remedy, specific performance, which 
Campbell had previously abandoned by failing to present evidence at trial or argument 
or authority on appeal to the District Court. The District Court upheld Judge Brower's 
1 Since this case was appealed to the Supreme Court, Judge Brower passed away from a long-standing fight with 
cancer. 
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other findings dismissing Campbell's remaining claims. Parkway now appeals the 
portion of the District Court's decision which imposed the specific performance remedy, 
as well as certain other aspects of the District Court's decision. 
2. Course of Proceedings Below 
Campbell brought action against Parkway on October 14, 2005, alleging breach 
of contract and seeking an award of money damages. (R. p. 15-19.) The Complaint was 
amended twice with the Second Amended Complaint adding causes of action for 
declaratory judgment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
constructive fraud, tortious interference with contract. (R. p. 54-62.) 
A bench trial was conducted on July 25, 2012, in the Magistrates Division of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court, in Bingham County. (R. p. 86.) Throughout the trial, 
Campbell prosecuted the case as a breach of contract case and sought contractual 
damages for herself. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge held that Parkway was 
in breach of the oral contract, awarded contractual damages in the amount of $6,800.00 
to Campbell, and awarded Campbell attorney's fees and costs. (R. p. 89.) Campbell 
drafted the Judgment. (R. p. 91-96, 101-05.) Parkway subsequently appealed the 
decision to the District Court alleging that Campbell could not obtain contract damages 
where there was no injury. (R. p. 105-08; 127-44.) The District Court heard oral 
argument on the matter, but remanded the matter back to the Magistrate Division of the 
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District Court for additional findings as to Campbell's claims of breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive fraud, and tortious interference with 
contract. (R. p. 196-99.) Thereafter, the Magistrate Division of the District Court 
entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. p. 202-07.) The 
Magistrate Judge found in favor of Parkway on all the remaining causes of action. (Id.) 
Campbell subsequently Cross-Appealed the Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. p. 212-15.) 
On April 16, 2014, the District Court issued its Decision and Order on Appeal. 
(R. p. 210-54.) The District Court's Decision and Order on Appeal concluded that 
Campbell could not obtain contract damages where there was no injury (as argued by 
Parkway), holding "Campbell is not entitled to a direct money judgment against 
Parkway .... " (R. p. 237.) Instead, the District Court held that Campbell's claim for 
declaratory judgment was a claim for specific performance (R. p. 236), despite the fact 
that Campbell had never actually pleaded a claim for specific performance. (R. p. 54-
62.) This was the first time the issue of specific performance had been raised or 
asserted. There is no evidence in the record of Campbell pursuing a claim of specific 
performance. The District Court ultimately ruled against Campbell on her other causes 
of action. However, these alternative causes of action are not presently before the Court. 
(R. p. 281-85.) Parkway now appeals from the District Court's decision. 
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3. Statement of Facts 
The facts from the trial in this matter are relatively undisputed as it applies to the 
issues on appeal. In 2002, Campbell was an employee of Bingham Memorial Hospital 
(hereafter referred to as "BMH"). (R. p. 84-85.) Campbell had entered into a Forgivable 
Loan Agreement with BMH wherein $6,800.00 was paid to Campbell for tuition to her 
nursing program in exchange for certain employment commitments with BMH. (R. p. 
85.) The $6,800.00 was to be repaid in three (3) annual installments over three (3) 
years. (Exhibit A.) The first installment was to be paid, "on the first day of the month 
following the anniversary of Student Nurse's graduation from Nursing School, or in the 
case Student Nurse fails to graduate, the first day of the month following her/his 
discontinuation of the nursing program." The agreement, however, also contained a 
provision that if Campbell was a full time employee of BMH "for at least twelve (12) 
months prior to the date of any of the three payments, the installment payment shall be 
forgiven." (Id.) Further, the agreement provided that "In the event, [Campbell] is 
employed full time for a portion of the twelve month period, the installment payment 
shall be reduced pro rata." (Id.) It is undisputed that Campbell began working for BMH 
in 2000 and quit working for them in May 2003. 
On or about May 27, 2005, Campbell began working for Parkway. (R. p. 86.) 
Campbell was an at-will employee at Parkway. (R. p. 88.) As part of her employment, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 8 
Campbell was told that her obligation with BMH under the Forgivable Loan Agreement 
would be "taken care of." (R. p. 86.) The trial court made the factual finding that 
Parkway "assured her, in general terms 'that the obligation would be taken care of,' with 
no mention of any further conditions or restrictions relating to the payment of that 
obligation." (Id.) Campbell left employment with Parkway in March 25, 2005. (Id.) At 
the date of filing the Complaint in this matter, Campbell asserted that she had "incurred 
damages and will continue to incur damages." (R. p. 18.) As of the date of trial, 
however, BMH had not pursued any action against Campbell, and neither Campbell nor 
Parkway had paid anything to BMH. (R. at 86; Trial Transcript, p. 60, I. 21 - p. 61, I. 
2.) 
4. Standard of Review 
This Court is being asked to review the District Court's decision after the District 
Court sat in its appellate capacity over the magistrate judge's decision. Accordingly, the 
standard of review by this Court is as follows: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of 
law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the 
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the 
magistrate's decision, [the Supreme Court] affirms the district court's 
decision as a matter of procedure. Thus, [the Supreme Court] does not 
review the decision of the magistrate court. Rather, [the Supreme Court is] 
procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court. 
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Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-218 (2013). 
An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, if it was not previously 
presented to the trial judge. See, e.g., McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 
317, 323 (2003). "Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and 
arguments that were presented [in the lower court]. In order to preserve an issue for 
appeal, the issue must be raised in the [lower court] ... Appellate courts follow this rule 
because it would be unfair to overrule the [lower court] on issues not presented to it on 
which it did not have an opportunity to rule." Wattanbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 323-24, 246 P.3d 961, 967-77 (2010) (internal citations omitted). 
II. ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
The Issues on Appeal are as follows: 
A. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Campbell was entitled to judgment 
on her breach of contract claim; 
B. Whether the District Court erred m ruling that Campbell and/or BMH was 
entitled to an award of damages on Campbell's breach of contract claim; 
C. Whether Campbell was entitled to relief ( e.g., specific performance) based on 
evidence, arguments and/or authorities that Campbell had not presented or 
argued; 
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D. Whether the District Court erred by ruling that the statute of frauds was 
inapplicable; 
E. Whether the Magistrate and District Courts erred in awarding Campbell attorney 
fees and costs. 
F. Whether the Magistrate and District Courts erred in failing to award Parkway 
attorney fees and costs. 
G. Whether Parkway is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal to the Supreme 
Court. 
III. ARGUMENT 
1. Campbell Lacks Standing 
Applying the undisputed facts to well-settled Idaho law, the Court must conclude 
that Campbell does not have standing in this matter. Campbell has not demonstrated 
that she suffered any injury whatsoever, much less the requisite distinct and palpable 
injury. Further, her efforts to litigate a remedy for a third-party, Bingham Memorial 
Hospital (BMH), are also barred under the established standing analysis. Therefore the 
decisions of the Magistrate Judge, as well as the District Judge on Appeal, must be 
reversed. 
Whether a litigant has standing is a jurisdictional issue that must be addressed 
even if it was not raised or address by the trial court. Beach Lateral Water Users Assoc. 
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v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 603, 130 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2006). Standing is an issue over 
which this court exercises free review. Citibank (South Dakota), NA. v. Carroll, 148 
Idaho 254, 257, 220 P.3d 1073, 1076 (2009). The issue of whether a party has standing 
to assert a particular claim should be resolved before the merits of the claim are reached. 
Id. at 259, 220 P.3d at 1078. Standing is a matter of justiciability along with ripeness 
and mootness. Blankenship v. Washington Trust Bank, 153 Idaho 292, 295, 281 P.3d 
1070, 1073 (2012). "Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not the issues the 
party wishes to have adjudicated." Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 513, 248 
P.3d 1243, 1248 (2011) (quoting Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-05, 44 
P.3d 1157, 1159-60 (2002)). 
In order to satisfy the case and controversy requirement of standing, the litigant 
"must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. The requirement that the 
litigant show an "injury in fact" mandates that the litigant demonstrate two separate 
facts: (1) a distinct and palpable injury, and (2) a fairly traceable causal connection 
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Id. The term "palpable" in this 
context has been defined by this Court as "[ e ]asily perceptible, plain, obvious, readily 
visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest." Id. at footnote 3 (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary, 1110 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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Applying these well-settled principles to the undisputed facts in the record, 
Campbell does not have standing in this matter. First, it is undisputed that Campbell has 
not suffered any injury. This issue of whether Campbell suffered injury was argued both 
before the Magistrate Division of the District Court (R. p. 96-100.), as well as before the 
District Court, under established principles of contract law that a party cannot bring suit 
for breach of contract when the party has not been injured. (R. p. 105-08, 127-
44.) Bergkamp v. Martin, 114 Idaho 650, 653, 759 P.2d 941, 944 (Ct. App. 1998). The 
District Court agreed with this legal mandate, and found that Campbell had not been 
injured. The District Court held, "Campbell is not entitled to recover the amount of the 
debt personally ... " and that "Campbell is not entitled to a direct money judgment against 
Parkway .... " (R. p. 237.) Instead, the District Court determined, sua sponte, that 
Campbell was actually seeking specific performance to recover damages for a third-
party, and the District Court's focus proceeded to Campbell's ability to recover under 
that theory. (R. p. 236.) 
As discussed above, however, the standing analysis does not focus on the 
underlying legal claims, or even the remedy sought. Instead, the standing analysis 
focuses on the party, in this case Campbell, and whether she herself suffered an injury in 
fact, by demonstrating a distinct and palpable injury and a causal connection between 
the injury and conduct. Applying the legal framework of Blankenship v. Washington 
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Trust Bank, and Martin v. Camas County, supra, Campbell does not have a injury in 
fact, much less a distinct and palpable injury, and therefore does not have standing. 
When this action was first brought, Campbell alleged in her Complaint that she 
had been damaged "in the amount of $6,800.00 in addition to interest and attorney fees" 
and that Campbell "will continue to incur damages." (R. p. 18.) It was upon these 
assertions that Campbell pursued this litigation. The record, however, reveals that 
Campbell never was, nor ever has been, actually damaged by Parkway. The evidence in 
the record of this undisputed fact comes from Campbell's own sworn testimony. At the 
trial, Campbell admitted that she had never received any demand letter from BMH and 
had, in fact, paid nothing on the agreement with BMH. 
Q. (BY MR. SORENSEN) You've never received a demand letter from 
any attorney for the hospital or the foundation to repay this obligation; is 
that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And so at this point, you have paid nothing on this obligation? 
A. That is correct. 
(Trial Transcript at p. 60, L. 21 - P. 61, L. 1) (emphasis added). 
The admission by Campbell that she has not suffered any injury is fatal to her 
standing to bring this action. Campbell has not suffered a distinct and palpable injury 
and thus cannot demonstrate an "injury in fact" as required by Idaho law. Accordingly, 
her claims must be dismissed. 
There are, admittedly under Idaho law, situations where a party can litigate a 
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claim for a third-party. One such example is in the case of State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 
231 P.3d 1016 (2010). In Doe, this Court addressed the situation where the plaintiff 
argued that the curfew statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on parents' 
liberty interest in directing the upbringing of their children. Id. at 936, 231 P.3d at 
1033. This Court, however, dismissed the action because then plaintiff lacked 
standing. Id. This Court laid out the rationale for this ruling as follows: 
Courts must hesitate before resolving the rights of those not parties to 
litigation. Even though a potentially illegal action may affect the litigant as 
well as a third party, the litigant may not rest his claims on the rights or 
legal interests of the third party. A party challenging the constitutionality 
of a statute must not only demonstrate some injury from the 
unconstitutional aspect of the statute, but also that he is in the class of 
persons protected by that constitutional interest. This requirement is based 
on the presumption that the third parties themselves are the best 
proponents of their own rights. 
Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the three-party 
analysis enunciated in the United States Supreme Court case of Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400,411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370-71, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 425-26 (1991), as follows: 
[T]he U.S. Supreme Court requires a litigant who seeks to assert the rights 
of another party to demonstrate three interrelated criteria: ( 1) he must have 
suffered injury in fact, providing a significantly concrete interest in the 
outcome of the matter in dispute; (2) he must have a sufficiently close 
relationship to the party whose rights he is asserting; and (3) there must be 
a demonstrated bar to the third parties' ability to protect their interests. 
Ultimately, this Court held that Doe "failed to demonstrate any bar to his father's ability 
to challenge the constitutionality of the Ordinance." Id. at 937, 231 P.3d at 1034. 
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Likewise, in this case there is insufficient evidence that Campbell can meet prong 
one and three of the Powers test, and therefore she does not have standing to enforce the 
rights of BMH. As to the first prong, discussed extensively above, Campbell has not 
suffered an injury in fact herself. As to the third prong, there is no "demonstrated bar" 
to BMH ability to protect its own interests. There is no evidence in the record showing 
that BMH lacked knowledge of their rights or were in some respect prevented from 
protecting their interests. Accordingly, Campbell does not have standing to bring 
litigation on behalf of BMH. 
The recent case of Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 274 P.3d 1249 (2012) 
is instructive. In Arambarri, the plaintiff sought reinstatement of his employment, as 
well as three other fellow employees. The defendant contested the plaintiffs standing 
on various grounds. Id. at 738, 274 P.3d at 1253. This Court applied the legal 
framework of Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011) 
concluding that the plaintiff himself had standing because he had alleged "sufficient 
injury in fact, traceability and redressibility with regard to his request for damages for 
his lost wages and benefits." Id. As such, the claims were "personal to Arambarri and 
have adversely impacted him." Id. The Court went on, however, to hold that the 
plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the defendant's actions in relation to the 
other three employees. Id. at 738-39, 274 P.3d at 1253-54. 
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Similarly, in this case Campbell does not have standing to pursue claims and 
redress for third-party, especially in light of the fact that she herself did not suffer any 
injury in fact. Although there may be speculation as to what, if any, injury BMH may 
have suffered, such conjecture is not established in the record and in no event confers 
standing upon Campbell. See State v. Doe, supra. To hold otherwise would open the 
door to judicial vigilantism where individuals that have not been damaged pursue claims 
for third-parties, even when such third-parties are entirely capable of doing so 
themselves and have chosen not to do so. There has been no adjudication that there was 
any obligation to BMH, only a "Forgivable Loan Agreement" that might at some point 
give rise to an obligation. There is simply no evidence that BMH was damaged or could 
not protect their rights. Accordingly, Campbell does not have standing to litigate for 
and on behalf of BMH. 
2. Campbell Received All Of The Benefit Of The Bargain With Parkway, 
Which Did Not Include Mandating The Manner In Which Parkway Took 
Care Of Any Obligation, Should It Have Arisen. 
The record is clear that Campbell obtained all the benefit that she bargained for 
under the purported agreement with Parkway. As discussed above, there is very little 
detail of such agreement (hence the need for a Statute of Frauds). The agreement was 
simply that the obligation with BMH would be "taken care of." 
It is undisputed that the representations to Campbell at the time she was hired by 
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Parkway was only that the obligation "would be taken care of." Campbell testified, "I 
started work at Parkway May 27th, 2003, and they said the loan would be taken care 
of." (Trial Transcript at P. 88, IL 18-19). 
Nanette Hirschi, who was with Art McCracken when the offer was made, testified 
similarly. Ms. Hirschi was the Director of Nursing at Parkway. (Trial Transcript at P. 
111, IL 4-5). Ms. Hirschi testified that the terms of employment for Campbell were very 
limited: 
Q. Okay. And so what were the terms of that offer, just to be clear, that 
you could offer to Michelle? 
A. That there was a dollar amount for her hourly wage, that she was a full-
time employee, and that her scholarship would be taken care of. 
(Trial Transcript at P. 124, IL 17-22). She also testified that one of the methods 
contemplated to "take care of' Campbell's obligation was to wait and see if BMH 
actually attempted to enforce the agreement with Campbell. Ms. Hirschi testified of the 
internal conversation of Parkway as follows: 
I remember one of them -- I don't remember which one -- saying "Well, we 
need to do whatever -- whatever we need to do to get Michelle. And if we 
need to pay back her scholarship, we'll pay back her scholarship." 
And I remember somebody making the comment "Bingham probably 
won't come after her." 
And I can remember saying "But if they do, we'll be responsible. It will 
need to be taken care of." 
(Trial Transcript at P. 123, IL 11-20). Ms. Hirschi testified a second time that Parkway 
contemplated waiting to see ifBMH took action to enforce the agreement with Campbell 
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as follows: 
Q. At the board meeting when there was some discussion about an 
obligation to Bingham on Michelle Campbell's behalf, was there also some 
discussion about maybe not -- that that obligation may not be due or ever 
have to be paid? 
A. I remember somebody made a comment "Bingham probably won't ever 
go after her." 
(Trial Transcript at P. 141, 11. 13-19). 
In fact, how and when such obligation "would be taken care of'' was never 
discussed. (Trial Transcript at P. 137, L. 23- P. 138, 11. 3). When Ms. Hirschi was asked 
about her authorization to hire Campbell, she testified: 
Can you tell me the circumstances behind the authorization where you felt 
you were authorized to do that? 
A. Discussion with the board members about Michelle, about her 
scholarship obligation. They agreed to take care of it however they 
decided to take care of it. And they authorized us to hire Michelle. So we 
went forward at their direction. 
(Trial Transcript at P. 144, 11. 14-21) (emphasis added). 
Mr. McCracken, who was the CFO and an administrator for Parkway (Trial 
Transcript at P. 160, 11. 10-18) testified the offer to take care of Campbell's obligation 
was not a signing bonus and the details were not specified as to how or when: 
I wouldn't consider it a signing bonus. But at that time, none of the details 
had been spelled out as to how that obligation would be handled. 
Q. Do you recall whether there were discussions about when the obligation 
would be paid? 
A.No. 
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(Trial Transcript at P. 172, 11. 11-16) (emphasis added). Mr. McCracken went on to 
testify: 
Q. Okay. And as far as you knew, the board hadn't authorized you to say 
"We're going to give you $6,800 if you come to work for us"? 
A. No. That wasn't the authorization at all. It was authorization to extend 
employment under the agreement that they would take care of her 
obligation. 
Q. Okay. By taking care of the obligation, do you mean that if the 
obligation -- if there did exist an obligation, it would be paid by Parkway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If there wasn't an obligation, it wouldn't be paid by Parkway? 
A. Why would they pay for an obligation if there was no obligation? We're 
talking about a very financially distressed organization that -- the intent 
was to save money, not extend new debt. 
(Trial Transcript at P. 181, L. 25 - P. 182, L. 15). Mr. McCracken further testified: 
Q. So it was your understanding from the board meeting and whatever was 
discussed by members of the board -- if there was nothing owed by 
Michelle Campbell, what was the responsibility of the Parkway Surgery 
Center with regard to that forgivable loan? 
A. There were no specific terms discussed. It was "We will take care 
of the obligation." 
My assumption is that if there was no obligation -- and this is my own 
thought process -- is that the surgery center wouldn't write a check if 
there was no obligation. If there was an obligation, they had indicated 
their intent to take care of that. 
(Trial Transcript at P. 186, L. 21 - P. 187, L. 7) (emphasis added). Thus, if there never 
arose the obligation (i.e., BMH never enforced its agreement with Campbell) then 
Parkway would not pay the $6,800. 
Lastly, Mr. McCracken testified regarding a letter he wrote to Campbell's counsel 
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stressing that Parkway would pay, but only if a "penalty" arose from Campbell's 
agreement with BMH: 
Q. In your letter, which is -- I think that's Exhibit F -- in the third 
paragraph -- actually, the fourth paragraph down, it says "Dr. Robert Lee, 
in efforts to attract and capture Michelle's commitment to the organization 
had offered repayment of any penalty caused by breach of Michelle's 
contract with the hospital, would be met and satisfied in full by Parkway 
Surgery Center, the employer." 
Do you remember writing that? 
A. Yes I do. 
(Trial Transcript at P. 206, L. 18 - P. 207, L. 2.) (emphasis added). 
Under Idaho law, "[The] purpose of awarding damages for breach of contract is 
to fully recompense the non-breaching party for its losses sustained because of the 
breach, not to punish the breaching party." Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796, 801, 606 
P .2d 90, 95 (1980). Campbell is, and has been for the duration of this litigation, in the 
same position that she was before her contractual relationship with Parkway; namely, 
she has not paid anything to BMH nor has she been obligated on any debt, thus no 
injury. Further, Campbell has realized her expectation under the agreement. Her 
obligation to BMH was, in fact, taken care of. 
Whether there may have been a breach of a contractual agreement between BMH 
and Campbell, and a resulting obligation, has not been established in the record or 
otherwise adjudicated. Thus any such conclusion is purely speculative. The existence 
of the Forgivable Loan Agreement does not equate an obligation owed to BMH. Such 
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agreement only indicated a potential claim. Any breach of Campbell's agreement with 
BMH has not been established, and the limitations period for BMH to assert that claim 
has long since passed. Moreover, whether the agreement between Campbell and BMH 
was breached, and whether there was injury to BMH, is squarely outside of this scope of 
this litigation. 
What is within the scope of this litigation is the agreement between Campbell and 
Parkway. The record is clear that Campbell obtained all her expectations under the 
agreement - she has not been required to pay anything to BMH based on her previous 
agreement with BMH. Accordingly, Campbell has received the benefit of her bargain 
with Parkway, and there was no breach of any contractual terms between Campbell and 
Parkway. 
Campbell's contention, it would appear, is not that she was injured or that she 
failed to receive the benefit of the bargain, but that she objects to the method upon which 
Parkway took care of the obligations to BMH. Campbell, however, had no contractual 
right to control or determine how, or when, the obligation would be taken care 
of. Indeed, the record demonstrates that the obligation was, in fact, taken care of. The 
trial court's findings support this conclusion when it found, that Parkway "assured her, 
in general terms 'that the obligation would be taken care of,' with no mention of any 
further conditions or restrictions relating to the payment of that obligation." (R. p. 86.) 
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Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, Parkway could have taken care of 
the obligation in a variety of ways such as paying the amount immediately, paying the 
obligation in installment payments, negotiating a compromise settlement of the 
obligation, off-setting the amount against another debt, or simply waited to see if BMH 
elected to pursue an action under its contract. Certainly there could be defenses raised 
had BMH pursued such action, and it is conjecture to assume BMH would be able to 
establish a breach. In short, absent some express provision limiting Parkway, Campbell 
could only look to her own expectation that the she would not bear liability on the 
obligation, which expectation and benefit she received. 
3. The District Court Erred In Awarding The Specific Performance Remedy. 
A. The District Court erred in holding that Campbell's cause of action 
for declaratory judgment was a claim for specific performance. 
The District Court erred in treating Campbell's claim for declaratory judgment as 
a claim for specific performance because the Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code 
section 10-1201, et seq. only allows for the declaration of rights, status, and other legal 
relations. It does not provide for fact intensive remedies such as specific performance. 
Accordingly, the District Court's sua sponte conversion of the claim for declaratory 
judgment into a claim of specific performance was in error. 
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This issue was squarely dealt with by this Court in the case of Farmers Ins. 
Exchange v. Tucker, 142 Idaho 191, 125 P.3d 1067 (2005). In Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
the Court examined whether a trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
plaintiff to file an amended complaint asserting a declaratory claim to determine whether 
a party must pay damages and to whom, but it refused the amendment to determine the 
amount of the damages. Id. at 194, 125 P.3d at 1070. In rendering its decision, this 
Court examined the nature of the Declaratory Judgment Act as follows: 
The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes courts to declare rights, status, 
and other legal relations. I.C. § 10-1201. 
The district court began its analysis by examining the literal words of the 
statute. It correctly noted that the literal words of the statute should be 
given their plain, obvious and rational meaning and that the court does not 
need to engage in statutory construction if the language is clear and 
unambiguous. The district court determined that the provisions of the Act 
are clear and unambiguous and that the court had the ability to "declare a 
party's rights, status, and other legal relations under [the FIE] insurance 
contract." 
Id. at 193-94, 125 P.3d at 1069-70. 
In making its determination, the District Court relied on the case of Ennis v. 
Casey, 72 Idaho 181,238 P.2d 435 (1951): 
A statute worded the same as [I.C. § 10-1201] has been enacted by many 
of the states, also the United States Congress. No authority from any 
decision of the states, or the United States, has been called to our attention 
where the statute had been interpreted to include an adjudication of rights 
and liability which necessitated the determination of whether or not a tort 
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or wrong had been committed, or to determine a liability due to breach of 
contract. 
Id. at 184, 238 P.2d at 437. The District Court further relied upon Country Ins. Co. v. 
Agricultural Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 961, 972, 695 P.2d 346, 357 (1984), where 
this Court held that "the Declaratory Judgment Act is not a freeway open for the 
litigation of factual disputes." 
In this matter, Campbell asserted in her Second Amended Complaint "As a result 
of Defendant's breach, Plaintiff has incurred damages and will continue to incur 
damages, and/or is entitled to a declaratory judgment directing Defendant to repay her 
Forgivable Loan Agreement with Bingham Memorial." (R. p. 58.) There is no mention 
in any of Campbell's pleadings or briefing to specific performance because it simply 
was not pleaded. Instead, there is an explicit claim for declaratory judgment, which by 
express provisions is limited in scope to the declaration of "of rights, status, and other 
legal relations." Idaho Code section 10-1201. 
After the trial in this matter, Campbell was awarded contractual damages. (R. p. 
91-95, 101-04.) At no time did Campbell object to such an award arguing specific 
performance, either on the Motion for Reconsideration before the Magistrate Division of 
the District Court, or on appeal before the District Court. It was the District Court that 
first raised this issue on appeal and changed a claim for declaratory judgment to a claim 
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of specific performance. This was not an issue that was tried by consent. 
This Court very recently addressed the issue of a claim not being pied in the case 
of Mahnami v. Mahnami, 156 Idaho 338, 325 P.3d 679 (2014), holding: 
In Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191, 191 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Ct. App. 
2008), this Court set forth the standard by which we determine if an issue 
was tried by consent: 
The purpose of Rule l 5(b) is to allow cases to be decided on 
the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements. 
Nevertheless, due process requires that parties have 
sufficient notice of the issues to be tried and an opportunity 
to address those issues with evidence and argument. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court has said, "When issues are not raised 
by the pleadings, the evidence raising the legal issue must be 
clear enough so that both parties know of the issue and 
consent to the issue being tried." Trial of a claim or defense 
by consent is not established merely because evidence 
relevant to that issue was introduced; rather, it must appear 
both parties understood that the evidence was aimed at the 
unpleaded issue. 
Id. at_, 325 P.3d at 682 (internal citations omitted) ( emphasis added). 
In this matter, specific performance was not pled. Declaratory judgment was 
pied, but not tried. Accordingly, the District Court erred in sua sponte raising a specific 
performance argument that had not been properly or actually raised by Campbell. 
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B. Campbell waived any specific performance remedy by failing to 
present sufficient evidence at trial. 
The usual rules as to presumptions and burden of proof in civil actions are 
applicable to actions to enforce specific performance of contracts. Here, Campbell 
failed to request specific performance as a remedy. (R., p. 19.) Assuming, arguendo, 
that Campbell amended her Complaint to request a specific performance remedy 
(notwithstanding the arguments above that the second amended complaint does not 
actually request this remedy) (R. p. 61.), the burden is on Campbell to show her right to 
specific performance. See, e.g., 81A C.JS. Specific Performance §130 (Nov 2014); see 
also Thorn Springs Ranch v. Smith, 137 Idaho 480; 50 P.3d 975 (2002) (recognizing 
burden of proof is on party seeking specific performance remedy). As specific 
performance is an extraordinary equitable remedy, only available when other legal 
remedies are inadequate (see, e.g., Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 823, 136 P.3d 
291, 294 (2005)), Campbell also had the burden of showing an award of monetary 
damages would be inadequate. See, e.g., Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 582, 701 P.2d 
198, 202 (1985); see also Manus v. Colorado Baseball 1993, Inc., et al., 1996 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 32995 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he burden is on the party seeking specific 
performance to show that damages are an inadequate remedy.") (citing Leach v. Fuller, 
65 Colo. 68, 173 P. 427 (Colo. 1918)). 
Here, Campbell's evidence at trial, and arguments at trial, consisted of evidence 
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related to her alleged monetary damages. Consistent with her early pleas for relief, 
Campbell focused her trial evidence on a monetary damage award, and ignored any 
evidence of the inadequacy of monetary damages. By failing to present any evidence 
that a monetary damage award would be inadequate ( and, indeed, by presenting and 
arguing the exact opposite - that a monetary damage award was proper), Campbell 
abandoned and/ or waived any request she previously had made for specific performance. 
The District Court erred when it imposed the specific performance remedy that 
Campbell had previously abandoned or waived by failing to present evidence at trial. 
C. Campbell waived any specific performance remedy by failing to argue 
it on appeal. 
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they should not be considered by the appellate court, and a party waives an 
issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. See, e.g., Van v. Portneuf 
Med. Ctr., Idaho , 330 P.3d 1054, 1064 (2014) (citing Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, - -
Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 17, 278 P.3d 415, 419 (2012)). Here, not only did Campbell not 
present evidence at trial to support a specific performance remedy, but Campbell did not 
pursue the specific performance remedy on appeal to the District Court. There was no 
legal authority or argument presented to the District Court on appeal regarding the 
specific performance remedy. In fact, Campbell's counsel specifically requested the 
damage award in the context of the post-trial motion for reconsideration. At the 
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argument on the motion for reconsideration, Campbell's counsel focused her argument 
on the proper measure of damages, stating the following: 
[A]t this point, I mean, clearly, the remedy for Ms. Campbell, according to 
Idaho law,is that the measure of damages is to put Ms. Campbell in the 
position she would have been in had the contract been fully performed. 
Exhibits, p. 240 (Transcript of hearing on Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10, LL 10 -
14). Additionally, in her brief on appeal to the District Court, Campbell focused solely 
on an award of damages: 
"Campbell proved the amount of damage with reasonable certainty." (R., 
p. 157). 
"Just like Mead, Campbell is entitled to damages for the debt Parkway 
areed to pay and did not." (R., p. 160). 
"The amount of the debt is exactly the damages the Court awarded to 
Campbell in this matter. Consequently, the Court should affirm the award 
of contract damages to Campbell." (R., p. 160). 
By failing to present any authority or any argument regarding the specific 
performance remedy on appeal to the District Court, Campbell again waived that remedy 
and it should not have been considered on appeal. Accordingly, the District Court erred 
in imposing a remedy on appeal for which Campbell had failed to argue or present 
authority. 
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D. Even If Not Previously Waived By Campbell, Specific Performance Is 
Not A Proper Remedy In This Matter. 
Specific perfonnance is an equitable remedy. "Equity will not intervene where 
the aggrieved party has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law. Specific 
performance is an extraordinary remedy that can provide relief when legal remedies are 
inadequate." Hull v. Giesler, _ Idaho _, 331 P.3d 507, 521 (2014) (internal 
citations omitted). "The object of specific performance is to best effectuate the purpose 
for which the contract is made." Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 597-98, 249 P.3d 390, 
396-97 (2011). Most importantly, specific performance is an alternative remedy for a 
breach of contract claim - it is not a claim by itself. In this case, the District Court 
imposed the specific performance remedy without any analysis of these required 
elements. Nowhere in its opinion does the District Court explain why the damage award 
made by the Magistrate Court was not a plain, speedy, adequate and complete remedy, 
or otherwise analyze why Campbell's other legal remedies were inadequate. 
The District Court correctly reformed the Magistrate Court's ruling and found 
that Campbell had not suffered any economic damages by Parkway's actions. 
Parkway's agreement with Campbell was to "take care of' her obligation to BMH. 
There was no meeting of the minds on what "take care of' actually meant. At this point 
BMH is legally prohibited from pursuing Campbell for recovery of the obligation -
accordingly there is nothing for Parkway to "take care of." In other words, not only has 
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Campbell not suffered any damage by Parkway's alleged failure to pay BMH -
Campbell will never suffer any damage.2 Specific performance of the agreement to 
"take care of' Campbell's obligations would not actually require Parkway to take any 
action at all -the obligations are already "taken care of' by operation of Idaho's statutes 
of limitation. 3 For these additional reasons, even if Campbell did not abandon and waive 
any specific performance remedy, it is not a proper remedy in this case, and the District 
Court erred by unilaterally imposing that remedy on Parkway. 
4. The Statute Of Frauds Applies To The Contract Between Parkway And 
Campbell. 
Idaho law provides that in certain cases, agreements are deemed legally invalid 
and unenforceable unless evidenced in writing. Idaho Code § 9-505. Among such 
agreements requiring a written contract is "[a] special promise to answer for the debt, 
default or miscarriage of another. ... " Idaho Code§ 9-505(2). Even with sufficient facts 
to prove the existence of the oral agreement, "it is unenforceable if there is not a 
sufficient writing to comply with the statute of frauds." Mickelsen Const., Inc. v. 
Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 401, 299 P.3d 203, 208 (2013). A sufficient writing includes 
the parties to the agreement, the subject matter, the price or consideration, a description 
2 It should also be remembered that the District Court correctly found that Campbell had not shown any reputation 
or other damages. This portion of the District Court's decision has not been appealed. 
3 See argument, supra, regarding Parkway's "taking care of' Campbell's debt. 
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of property covered or affected, and all essential terms and conditions of the agreement. 
The writing evidencing the agreement must contain all such terms, or else it cannot be 
enforced. See Hoffman v. SVCo., 102 Idaho 187, 190-91, 628 P.2d 218, 221-22 (1981). 
In this case, it is undisputed that there was no written agreement between the 
parties. Thus, the statute of frauds generally applies. Even if Campbell's agreement 
with Parkway were reduced to writing as enforceable under the statute of frauds, the 
sufficiency of the writing would be brought into serious question, negating the 
enforceability of the written agreement. In this case, the witnesses vaguely addressed 
that Campbell's obligation to BMH would be "taken care of," without setting forth any 
specifics with regard to the amount of the debt in question to be covered, consideration 
received, or general parameters of the agreement.4 The trial court made the factual 
finding that Parkway "assured her, in general terms 'that the obligation would be taken 
care of,' with no mention of any further conditions or restrictions relating to the payment 
of that obligation." (R. p. 86.) As discussed above, such a writing would fail to meet the 
minimum required elements to invoke statute of frauds enforceability. As "[a] special 
promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another .... ", Parkway's oral 
promise to "take care of' Campbell's BMH obligation was unenforceable under the 
statute of frauds unless an exception exists. See, e.g., Idaho Code§ 9-505(2). 
4 The testimony and evidence surrounding Campbell's obligation being "taken care of' is discussed in detail above. 
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Admittedly, there exist limited exceptions allowing for the enforceability of an 
oral agreement involving promises to answer for debt, including a promise being made 
"upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to 
the antecedent obligation, or from another person." Idaho Code § 9-506(3). Such an 
agreement is deemed an "original obligation" of the promisor (i.e., Parkway). Idaho 
Code § 9-506. While this exception has the potential to be interpreted over-broadly, 
thus potentially undermining the applicability of Idaho Code § 9-505(2), little case law 
exists to explain or clarify these provisions in greater detail. 
Assuming, arguendo, that§ 9-506(3) applies (which would exempt the agreement 
from the §9-505 requirement that it be written), the agreement between Campbell and 
BMH would accordingly be considered to be an "original obligation" of Parkway, as it 
was made "upon consideration beneficial to [Parkway]." As the original obligation 
would thus require Parkway to compensate BMH for Campbell's obligation, Campbell 
effectively became a non-party (or an incidental beneficiary) to Parkway's new original 
obligation, possessing no legal rights or recourse against Parkway or from BMH.5 See 
Jones v. Better Homes, Inc., 79 Idaho 294, 301-02, 316 P.2d 256, 260-61 (1957) 
( distinguishing between donee, creditor, and incidental beneficiaries to a contract, and 
5 Assuming that there was an obligation to BMH - an important fact which has not been established. 
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associated rights). 6 The District Court failed to address this argument - simply stating 
that it disagreed, and referring to the specific performance remedy. (See R., p. 238-39.) 
Notwithstanding the District Court's disagreement (based, apparently, on the previously-
waived specific performance remedy), the legal authority remains if this exception is to 
apply. By promising to take care of Campbell's debt to BMH, the Idaho statute of 
frauds makes the obligation Parkway's own new original obligation. Campbell was not 
then the party with recourse against Parkway - BMH was. 
The failure to reduce the Parkway/Campbell agreement to writing renders it 
unenforceable under Idaho's statute of frauds. If, however, the exception applies, it 
created an original obligation of Parkway, thus eliminating Campbell's cause of action 
for breach of contract against Parkway. In essence, the proper party for the breach of 
contract claim then became BMH, rather than Campbell. For these reasons, the 
Magistrate Court's decision regarding the statute of frauds issues (as later upheld by the 
District Court) should be reversed. 
5. Parkway Is Entitled To An Award Of Attorney Fees And Costs And 
Campbell Is Not Entitled To Such An Award. 
Parkway should be awarded Attorney's Fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. "LC. § 12-120(3) ... allows recovery for attorney 
fees by the prevailing party in any commercial transaction." Mackay v. Four Rivers 
6 See also argument, supra, regarding Campbell's standing to pursue the breach of contract claim. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 34 
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 415, 179 P.3d 1064, 1071 (2008). A "commercial 
transaction" is defined as any transaction, except transactions for personal household 
purposes. LC. § 12-120(3). Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 881, 204 P.3d 508, 521 
(2009). The award of attorney fees is mandatory in commercial transactions of this 
nature. See Clement v. Franklin Inv. Group, Ltd., 689 F. Supp 1575 (D. Idaho 1988) 
(citing Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 723 P.2d 925 (Ct.App. 1986)). 
Campbell did not have standing to bring this action in the first instance because 
Campbell had not suffered a distinct and palpable injury. Further, Parkway was the 
prevailing party on virtually all of the claims, both at the trial court level, and at the 
District Court. 7 Parkway should be considered the prevailing party at all levels of this 
litigation as this is a commercial transaction. Consequently, as Campbell was not 
actually the prevailing party, and should not be the prevailing party on appeal, she is not 
entitled to an award of any fees and costs, and the Magistrate and District Courts erred in 
awarding her fees and costs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon, and as outlined in, the foregoing, the relevant decisions rendered 
below by the District Court and Magistrate Court must be reversed. 
7 Indeed, the District Court ruled that Campbell had not proven her breach of contract claim, as she had not 
suffered any damages. The District Court then improperly awarded Campbell specific performance a remedy she 
had not actually pied, or had specifically abandoned and waived. See argument supra. 
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DATED this 5th day of December, 2014. 
Surgery Center, 
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